창작과 비평

 

Interviewer: Han Ki-wook (Editorial Board of Changjak-kwa-Bipyong) This interview was printed in Quarterly Changjak-kwa-Bipyong (Aug-Oct. 2002) with I. Wallerstein's article
"America and the World: The Twin Towers as Metaphor" which had been carried on the website of Social Science Research Council ( http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallerstein.htm ) last year. We prepared this interview to hear the latest opinion of I. Wallerstein.

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Q) Where were you at the moment of September 11 attacks and what were your initial feelings?
A) I was in my office, and someone telephoned to turn on the television. I thus saw almost everything from the beginning. My initial reaction was shock, horror, and amazement that anyone could be able to pull off such a bold attack.

 

Q) You mention in your paper that 　Most Americans have reacted to the events [of September 11] with deep anger, with patriotic resolve, and yet with considerable and persistent puzzlement. Puzzlement about two things: why did this happen? And how could it happen?　 And you seem to go on to judge that most Americans have not properly responded yet to that puzzlement. Do you think the same is true today?
A) I think the U.S. government has worked hard to keep the American people from asking themselves the kind of questions that might allow them to be less puzzled. I think they remain puzzled and uneasy, but I also think most people are not sure why they feel uneasy. They are not sure whom to blame, and in the absence of clarity, they fall back on the norm of supporting the government in time of national danger.

 

Q) George Katsiaficas, editor of New Political Science who spent several months in Korea last year, contributed to the Spring issue of our journal a short piece called September 11 and the American Conscience, in which he showed that an alarmingly large number of American intellectuals endorsed without reservation what their government and armed forces were doing, i.e. the worldwide war against terrorism. I wonder what is your view of the matter, whether there has been any significant change in the second phase of the war on terror with a possible attack on Iraq, and how your own critical stance has generally been received among your peers in America?
A) I think there is a strong tendency of many, perhaps most, Americans to be simultaneously isolationist and militarist that is, to want to stay out of issues beyond their frontiers and to want to show that the United States is the strongest power in the world. The alternative, more internationalist　 response of participating in a world community has always been a minority view, although one that has considerable support among educated, elite elements, who try by various means to persuade the majority. At the moment, the hawks- that is, those who embrace the isolationist/militarist posture, with an emphasis on the militarist side have, for the first time, effective control of the U.S. government. Will an Iraq war change this? No, if it is easily won, as the war against the Taliban. But I dont think it is possible to win that war easily, that is, without great loss of American lives. So, yes, I think there will be a shift in American public opinion, but not yet.

 

Q) President Bush used the expression axis of evil in his State of the Union Address, linking together mass destructive military potentials of Iran, Iraq and North Korea. I dont think the expression is just or even relevant, but his strong will to punish anti-American states can hardly be underestimated. At least it seems probable that he will strike Iraq sometime during his presidency. Attacking North Korea is, I believe, a totally different matter. Actually, there seems to have reemerged a trend of peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula in the months following President Bushs visit to South Korea last February. What has brought about the change, in spite of Bushs declared suspicion of North Korea as a potential enemy, would need detailed analysis and debate. But what I am really interested in is the question whether the current detent mood in Korea is a temporary phenomenon, a sort of an optical illusion in the long run, or rather a potentially exceptional space in the dark period of the world-system, made possible by a process of overcoming the division system on the Korean Peninsula. Would you care to comment on this?
A) Well, I think for the hawks the whole axis of evil is on the war agenda, but one at a time. That is to say, if they were to overthrow Saddam, they would next move to Iran and then to North Korea, and then to a number of other governments. But I doubt very much whether this intended scenario is possible. There is a difference between U.S. hawk intent and U.S. capacity.. Is there a real change on the side of the North Koreans? Unclear. There seems to be an internal struggle about strategy going on. And we do not know enough to know who will win. In the long run, I think North Korea must go for detente.

 

Q) Bruce Cumings, in his essay 　Some Thoughts Subsequent to September 11　(http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/cumings.htm), begins by quoting from Joseph Conrads Authors Note in The Secret Agent and praises the novelists rendering of a species of modern terrorism, saying, 　It was to this novel that I first turned after the catastrophic nihilism that toppled the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.　 Here is the passage Cumings quotes as the epigraph of his essay. "I remember . . . remarking on the criminal futility of the whole thing, doctrine, action, mentality; and on the contemptible aspect of the half-crazy pose as of a brazen cheat exploiting the poignant miseries and passionate credulities of a mankind always so tragically eager for self-destruction . . . a blood-stained inanity of so fatuous a kind that it was impossible to fathom its origin by any reasonable or even unreasonable process of thought." ( The Secret Agent , Penguin Books 1989, 8-9)
Cumings confesses that 　Conrads first impression then has become my conviction today　, and, based upon that conviction, argues that the September 11 attack came from the same species of infantile nihilism. What do you think of Conrads rendering of terrorists in The Secret Agent and how relevant do you find it to our understanding of September 11?
A) Well, I think Conrad captures the mentality of a lot of terrorists, but not at all necessarily that of the key players. Myself, I think Osama bin Laden is a cold, calculating analyst, who is playing a geopolitical game quite rationally. He wants the U.S. to overreact, force Muslim governments to do things that will cause much internal discontent and bring them down. From the beginning, I have thought that his primary objective was to make the governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia fall. He is doing quite well in Pakistan and so far less well in Saudi Arabia. But an Iraq war could help him in Saudi Arabia, even if the Saudis stay out. I think explanations of actions as irrational are always a last resort analytically. We should always start by presuming intelligent actors knowing what they are doing.

 

Q) I have another question related to literature. Edward Said noticed an irrational drive in the American publics rush to war after September 11 and compared it to Captain Ahabs mad pursuit of Moby Dick.(Islam and the West are inadequate banners, The Observer 9/16/2001) As a matter of fact I myself, as a student of American Literature, had independently raised a similar point on Changbis website(http://www.changbi.com). What do you think of the analogy? To what extent, if any, do you find it adequate in explaining the American publics collective war effort after September 11? Would you care to mention any classical texts of American Literature with a similar or more appropriate relevance to the current situation?
A) Said certainly has a point although I would think it is Saddam Hussein and not Osama bin Laden who is Moby Dick.

 

Q) The last question I would like to ask you is about the Israel/Palestine issue, which has been getting more serious after September 11. Since the Israeli Armys invasion into the Palestinian-controlled territories at the end of March, it has become harder than ever to hope for any reasonable peace plan, let alone the kind of 50-50 Arrangement of which the Saudi Arabian initiative would be an example. And it is now obvious that, as you said in your Commentary No.89 Israel/Palestine: Its Getting Ugly　(5/15/2002), America has abandoned any real pretense of fair-play involvement, and is making sure that no one else can play this role.　 Yet, as President Bush cannot afford to leave the future of Israel/Palestine to the bloody Ariel Sharon, who if unchecked is sure to devastate Americas relationship with its Arab allies, he now seems to be trying to improve or reshape the Israel/Palestine relationship with some kind of plan for a provisional Palestinian state. Do you think Americas efforts to improve the ugly situation can succeed? What points would you like to make on the issue of the Israel/Palestine conflicts in terms of the world politics of the post-September 11?
A) President Bush is subject to multiple and quite disparate pressures on these issues. But I wouldnt count on him to do anything useful or intelligent concerning Israel/Palestine. If there will be a change in the situation, it is more likely to come from within Israel than within the U.S. government. But I must confess I am not very optimistic.