[Feature] The Time for the ‘Transformative Middle Way’ Has Come / Paik Nak-chung
The Quarterly Changbi 207, Spring 2025
Featured Article ┃ The Advancement of K-Democracy
The Time for the ‘Transformative Middle Way’ Has Come
Paik Nak-chung 白樂晴
Editor Emeritus of The Quarterly Changbi, Emeritus Professor at Seoul National University. Author of National Literature and World Literature 1/In Search of the Logic of Human Liberation (combined revised edition), Conversations of Paik Nak-chung (volumes 1-8), D. H. Lawrence: Western Thinker of the ‘Great Opening’, Thought of Great Opening and Study of Religions, Toward a Global K-Thought (records of discussions), and others.
This year’s New Year’s column—published, as always, at the end of December in both Paik Nak-chung TV and Changbi Weekly Commentary—was written at an extraordinarily volatile political moment. On December 3, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law. By the time I completed the column, the National Assembly had already passed a resolution demanding the immediate lifting of martial law, and, on December 14, approved a motion to impeach the President. An important step toward resolving the crisis had thus been taken, but Yoon (now charged with sedition) continued to defy the arrest warrant, barricading himself inside the presidential residence. It was not until January 15 of the new year that he was finally taken into custody. As I write this article to supplement the original column, we are witnessing the unprecedented situation of a sitting president under arrest. The impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court and the criminal trial for inciting insurrection, however, remain ongoing.[1]
Even so, I see no need for major revisions to the original column. Only a few clarifications have been added as footnotes. The ensuing Afterword, entitled “The Middle Way and the World of Great Opening,” deals with issues either not addressed or not yet conceived at the time the column was written.
1. New Year’s Column (December 30, 2024): The Time for the ‘Transformative Middle Way’ Has Come
To the viewers of Paik Nak-chung TV, the readers of Changbi Weekly Commentary, and to all fellow citizens—the true sovereigns of this country—I extend my warmest New Year’s greetings. As we step into 2025, a year full of new hopes, I wish you many blessings both to receive and to create anew.
The Bizarre End of an Anomalous Situation
The anomaly called the Yoon Suk Yeol administration is drawing to a bizarre end. Of course, it is not fully over yet. Although the ringleader of the insurrection has been suspended from office following the passage of the impeachment motion, he remains the President, desperately maneuvering to escape his predicament by any means possible. But I do not believe the tide will turn in his favor.
For what we are witnessing now is not merely resistance to Yoon Suk Yeol’s reckless actions, but the powerful resurgence of the Candlelight Revolution. From the outset, Yoon’s rise to the presidency marked a sharp departure from the regime transitions of the pre-Candlelight days, when the ‘87 regime, established after the June 1987 uprisings, was still more or less functioning. His election was a temporary aberration, after the ‘87 regime had virtually run its course. It occurred while a new political order to realize the aspirations of the Candlelight citizens was having difficulties to take shape. Had the people of Korea endured this anomaly for the full five-year term, the Candlelight Revolution would have failed, and the long-cherished dream of the counter-revolutionary forces to install a regime worse than the ‘87 regime would have come true.
But what kind of people are we? Once the awakened citizens rose up again, the counter-revolutionaries found themselves, as someone said, “outnumbered and overpowered” (衆寡不敵).[2] Yet this protest movement is more than a show of numbers. True, it does not follow the commands of any single figure—neither Lee Jae-myung nor anyone else—but unlike the Great Candlelight Resistance of 2016–17, where political elites mainly worked to impede the energy of grassroots citizens, we now possess a channel for the people’s will to reach the political sphere more directly and without impediments.
The Evolution and Advancement of ‘Candlelight’
It is now clear that the Candlelight Revolution has not only persisted but also evolved during the so-called period of ‘anomaly.’ The surge of civil action since December 3 carries on the Great Candlelight Resistance Movement of 2016–17, yet it is far from a mere ‘revival.’ While the scale and intensity echo that earlier moment, the core driving force has shifted to a younger generation—those in their teens, twenties, and thirties. As seen in the widespread presence of K-pop light sticks, the character of the demonstrations has undergone a remarkable transformation. Turning rallies into festivals has been a hallmark of our protest culture since the 2000s, and this time, K-pop hits resonated alongside the traditional protest anthem, “Marching for Our Beloved,” in the streets. During the ‘Great Victory of Namtaeryeong,’ a mountain pass leading into the city-limits of Seoul, citizens stood alongside farmers as they broke through police barricades blocking their tractor march into the capital. “The Farmers’ Song” and K-pop hits were sung alternately at the protest site. Some citizens even brought along copies of Human Acts (Changbi, 2014) by Nobel laureate Han Kang, a novel that deals with the 1980 Gwangju massacre. Despite concerns over generational and class divides, the movement fostered a healing harmony, uniting K-pop, K-literature, and K-democracy.
Yoon Suk Yeol’s grotesque behavior vividly embodies the monstrous nature of the division system—a feature of the system I have repeatedly emphasized. However, this monstrosity is not confined to the Yoons and their allies. Yoon’s rise was made possible because each of us, having lived under the division system for so long, harbors a monster within ourselves, whether large or small, differing only in degree. If we had not internalized the same greed, dogmatism, and self-serving delusions, Yoon Suk Yeol would never have been elected in the first place, and removing him and his cohorts would not be so difficult. Thus, punishing the insurrectionaries and transforming ourselves must go hand in hand. This is not an attempt to excuse wrongdoing by arguing that ‘we are all sinners, so who can cast the first stone?’ Indeed, we must cultivate the capacity—rather the ‘art of using the mind’—to reject injustice resolutely, without succumbing to hatred.
The Scripture of the Founding Master (Daejonggyeong), a record of the sayings and deeds of Sotaesan (少太山) Pak Jung-bin (朴重彬), the Founding Master of Won-Buddhism, includes the following passage: “A wholesome person teaches the world through his wholesomeness, but the unwholesome person awakens the world through his unwholesomeness. The service of teaching and awakening the world is the same, but a wholesome person works for the world while gaining blessings for oneself, whereas an unwholesome person does the same while creating transgressions for oneself. Thus, we should pity rather than hate the unwholesome person” (Chapter 11, “Maxims,” verse 34). This teaching resonates deeply in today’s context, offering a new method of mind practice appropriate to the new era: the just punishment of actions, not individuals, with a mind free of hatred and anger. Such an approach is also the most effective way of healing one’s own wounds. The shortcomings of the Moon Jae-in administration can be attributed to the ruling party’s apparent neglect of such spiritual cultivation and assigning the crucial task of ‘cleaning up the legacy of corruption’ to politicized prosecutors—figures largely disconnected from such mind practice. The administration thus set itself on a path to failure, inadvertently paving the way for the current turmoil.
Time to Revisit ‘Transformation and the Middle Way’
But the challenge we face today extends beyond the cultivation of individual minds. It calls for a radical reimagining of a new political framework—one that matches the remarkable progress of the Candlelight Revolution. It is essential that we bring together awakened individuals to share ideas and thoughts that can lay the foundations for a new world. Looking back at the history of our democracy, despite the heroic struggles and undeniable accomplishments of our citizens, the period following the June Democratic Struggle of 1987 was marked by setbacks and failures, culminating in the disaster of Yoon Suk Yeol’s presidency. I believe the poverty of thought on the part of our society has played a major role in bringing us to this critical juncture.
In the immediate aftermath of the June Uprising, I called for the need to establish a new roadmap for a new era. In section 4 of my essay “The Unification Movement and Literature,” subtitled “A Perspective on the June Uprising” (The Quarterly Changbi, Spring 1989), I argued that the three dominant orientations of the movement—using the terms of the time, bourgeois democracy (BD), national liberation (NL), and people’s democracy (PD)—were no longer adequate to meet the demands of the new era. Put simply, once democratization had been achieved, the limitations of each stance became clear. The discourse of liberal democracy was content with restoring the civilian rule that had preceded military dictatorship. The NL clung to an idealized vision of reunification without fully grasping the entrenched reality of the division system. Meanwhile, PD’s aspiration for a people’s revolution within the bounds of the South was equally out of step with political reality. Taken in isolation, each of these approaches proved incompatible with the needs of the time. What was needed was a radical transformation—one that creatively synthesized their strengths. At that time, I had not yet formulated the concept of the “Transformative Middle Way.” It was only later that I introduced it explicitly—in Unification Korean Style, Present Progressive Tense (Changbi, 2006), specifically in Chapter 4, “Postscript: The Transformative Middle Way and Korean Democracy.” I developed the idea further in Where is the Middle Way and Wherefore Transformation? (Changbi, 2009), and recently revisited the discussion on Paik Nak-chung TV. In short, I argue that nothing less than the Transformative Middle Way—a creative integration of the three (BD, NL and PD)—can adequately address the challenges of our time.[3] Although the terrain of public discourse has since changed and further diversified, the unfortunate reality is that discourses lagging behind the vision of the Transformative Middle Way still dominate our political and intellectual landscape.
The Transformative Middle Way is a rigorous concept in its own way. If it were simply a pairing of two plausible words, it could end up becoming self-contradictory. However, ‘Transformation’ refers to the restructuring of the peninsula-wide system, while ‘Middle Way’ represents the strengthening of centrist forces within South Korea to achieve this goal by rising above simplistic logics that divide us. Thus, there is no inherent conflict between ‘Transformation’ and ‘Middle Way.’ Nevertheless, I acknowledge that the phrase may prove to be unduly strange as a political slogan, and I have made no special effort to promote or popularize it.
But I now believe the time has come to confront this issue deliberately. Couldn’t it be that the failure to take the Transformative Middle Way seriously was a cause for the failure of the activists who led the June Uprising and later entered politics to transform the ‘87 regime into a better one? A notable exception, rather, was the late President Kim Dae-jung, a statesman of the older generation. He enriched liberal democracy by incorporating elements of social democracy and charted an unprecedented course of reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas. However, the political climate of the time was deeply hostile to any adoption and implementation of the Transformative Middle Way, and he was weighed down by persistent red-baiting.
The Public’s Changed Appetite
Even during the 2016–17 candlelight protests, the Transformative Middle Way was not a central topic of discussion. Yet, the aspirations emerging from the grassroots were clearly different from what had gone before. The old political language used since the 1980s was often given the cold shoulder by the candlelight crowd, while the creative and often humorous slogans crafted by protesters signaled the emergence of new sensibilities, heralding a new era. Despite this, President Moon and his team—who proclaimed themselves the ‘Candlelight Government’—failed to recognize the significance of the Transformative Middle Way. In my view, the failure of the Moon Jae-in government is closely linked to the ideological impoverishment of its core leadership.
In the 2024 protests that rose to suppress Yoon Suk Yeol’s attempted insurrection, the public’s changed sentiments and aspirations have become even more pronounced. It is now evident that no established or rigid ideology can meet the expectations of a new generation—young people who see themselves as the true agents of history and the driving force of resistance, determined to ‘build a nation worthy of its name.’ If a prominent political leader—or at least a more powerful publicist than myself—were to step forward and say, “The path you are opening is nothing other than the Transformative Middle Way. Let us walk it together and expand it,” I believe the public would respond enthusiastically: “Yes, that’s exactly it. Let’s do so.” I believe that moment has finally arrived.
Creating a new language is not the responsibility of any single leader or individual. It is a collective task involving scholars, artists, journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens alike. It requires genuine self-reflection on the part of both individuals and groups. As someone who has long been involved in and supported civil society movements, I feel compelled to highlight the need for activists within civil society organizations themselves to critically examine their own shortcomings. They seem to have grown somewhat complacent in the course of combating specific irregularities in their given sectors. For instance, many of them still tout their ‘progressive’ credentials by dismissing the opposition Democratic Party—now transformed under the leadership of Lee Jae-myung —as just another ‘conservative party.’ Even now that the Democratic Party boasts a significantly larger public membership base than civil society organizations, there is still a tendency among these organizations to claim that only their activities represent the true civil society movement. This mindset persists even in the current climate where the Candlelight Revolution has united people from different backgrounds in pursuit of the Transformative Middle Way. Unfortunately, some civil society organizations are diminishing the momentum of the larger movement by clinging to their own agendas and insisting on excluding those who fall short of their cherished standards.
The Challenging Global Context and Unfavorable Conditions Facing the Candlelight Revolution
We are proud that the Candlelight Revolution is a rare example of a democratic and peaceful revolution in world history. It is undoubtedly a remarkable achievement for us to take pride in. Yet from another perspective, this revolution stands isolated—surrounded by challenging global conditions and entrenched hostile forces.
Inter-Korean relations are currently at one of their lowest points in history. The ‘transformation’ element of the Transformative Middle Way emphasizes dismantling the entrenched division system on the Korean Peninsula. Without meaningful progress on this front, achieving significant domestic reform will remain a difficult task. Yet, while improving inter-Korean relations and pursuing domestic reform are deeply interconnected, they do not necessarily have to advance in tandem. It is vital to prioritize whatever issues that are most pressing and open to advance within each domain, and thus to pursue a gradual, step-by-step, and innovative path toward the peninsula’s reintegration. However, if the current confrontation and tensions between the two Koreas continue, and if the North Korean leadership persists in viewing the South as its primary enemy, this may provide a convenient excuse for the South Korean establishment, which has long benefited from the peninsula’s division, to strike back. We need to remind ourselves how desperately the instigators of the December 3 incident tried to provoke conflict—or even war—between the two Koreas.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, adhering to its creed of the absolute unity between the Party and the people, may conflate the people of the South with the Yoon Suk Yeol government—recognized for its open hostility toward the North—by collectively branding them as the “Republic of Korea rabbles.” However, if the South were to succeed in removing Yoon Suk Yeol from power, it is likely that Pyongyang’s hostility towards the southern population would ease to some extent. Nevertheless, its policy shift towards a ‘state-to-state’ model of inter-Korean relations is unlikely to be reversed anytime soon. Yet, as I emphasized in my lecture at the Hanpyeong Academy and in subsequent writings, this shift could actually prove a positive development from the South’s perspective—especially given our long-standing vision of a Korean confederation (see YouTube channel paiknctv: “Overcoming the Division System and Nation-Building Korean Style,” May 2024; “New Phase in the Situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Division System,” The Quarterly Changbi, Fall 2024). After all, a North-South confederation or union would by definition be a union between states. Of course, it would be unrealistic to expect Pyongyang to readily embrace the idea of the Transformative Middle Way. Nevertheless, efforts to overcome the division system are likely to proceed in a more flexible, creative, and ultimately safer environment once the Yoon regime is removed from the scene.
Looking at the current global landscape, democratic institutions in many countries once seen as beacons of democracy —including the United States—have been deeply damaged, often almost to the point of irreversibility. Political participation of the people has increasingly taken the form of ‘right-wing populism.’ Even China, which identifies itself as socialist, seems unlikely to serve as an ideological model for the world. Economically, the situation is far more dire than it was during the 2017 Candlelight Protests. Regardless of who comes to power next, the top priority must be to rebuild the economy and restore the livelihoods devastated by the Yoon Suk Yeol government. The global economy has slowed significantly over the past eight years, and escalating tensions between the United States and China have placed Korea in an even more precarious position. The isolation of the Candlelight Revolution is now felt more acute and palpable.
But isolation can also be the burden borne by pioneers. The Candlelight Revolution has already demonstrated its extraordinary contagious force among the masses—not through government authority or establishment support, but through the widespread recognition of its visionary spirit by ordinary people. A striking recent example is protesters marching with K-pop light sticks, a vivid representation of the movement’s infectious energy and its power to grow global solidarity among Hallyu fans. The visual images must have sent a powerful message, awakening them to the truth: that having fun and fighting wholeheartedly is truly living well.
Another thing we should bear in mind is that South Korea’s Candlelight Protests did not suddenly appear in the 21st century. The peaceful revolutionary spirit of Donghak and the Founder Remission Movement it inspired[4] stand as pioneering examples of peaceful mass protest. The March 1 Movement was likewise rooted in the principles of non-violence. Of course, no matter how peaceful the people’s intended revolution, violent conflict often follows when the regimes respond with brutal repression—as seen in the Donghak Peasant Revolution of 1894 and, to some extent, the March First Movement. However, the sacrifices made during these uprisings, along with the bloodshed of independence struggles and people’s movements throughout the 20th century, have made it increasingly difficult for South Korean governments to suppress peaceful protests, at least since democratization in 1987. Today, the spirit of the Candlelight Revolution continues to shine—not only within Korea, but in the hearts of people around the world.
So, the “new hopes of 2025” is not an empty phrase. Let’s stay healthy and step forward as true sovereign citizens of the new world that is about to unfold.
2. The Middle Way and the World of Great Opening (February, 2025)
Originally, the ‘Transformative Middle Way’ was conceived as a pragmatic approach for South Korea to overcome the division system, distinct from the ‘Middle Way’ of Buddhism or Won-Buddhism, or the ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ of Confucianism. However, while writing my article “The 2013 Regime and the Idea of Transformative Middle Way” (2012), I came to understand that as we placed greater emphasis on mind practice in our efforts to overcome the division system, our political practice began to align more closely with the Middle Way in its religious and philosophical sense (cf./refer to Chapter 8, p. 193 of Modernity’s Double Project and Nation-Building Korean Style, Changbi, 2021). I elaborated further on this connection in my 2014 article, “Toward Great Accumulation of Merit and Great Transformation.”
Finally, I would like to emphasize that while the Transformative Middle Way is fundamentally a practical path tailored to South Korea, it is also linked to higher-level concepts such as the Buddhist ‘Middle Way’ and the Confucian ‘Doctrine of the Mean.’ This linkage creates a circular relationship among the key ideas discussed in this paper: overcoming the division system involves realizing in the context of the Korean peninsula the double project of adapting to and overcoming modernity aimed at transforming the modern world-system. For this, in addition to collective practice, individual mind practice and practice of the Middle Way are indispensable.[5] The Middle Way itself represents a universal standard, transcending the framework of modernity’s double project. Thus, it permeates the various dimensions of the tasks on hand that must be achieved. (refer to Chapter 9, p. 259 of the same book)
As I pointed out in the same article, my intention was not to show off ‘systematic completeness,’ but rather to acknowledge the complexity of the task at hand—a challenge that spans multiple dimensions, time periods, and spatial scales. The goal is to take action that is commensurate with this complexity. Now that the time for the Transformative Middle Way has finally arrived, it is more urgent than ever to identify the Middle Way appropriate to the ‘here and now’. Furthermore, while the ‘transformation’ of the Transformative Middle Way focuses primarily on addressing Korea’s division system, it is essential to recognize that this division system is part of the larger world-system. As such, our practice must also take into account the appropriateness of finding the right moment in the global context.
In response to the current situation, I have sought to make the term ‘The Idea of the Transformative Middle Way’ more accessible to the public by simplifying it to ‘Transformative Middle Way.’ However, regardless of the terminology, the concept will remain abstract unless it is accompanied by a thorough analysis of the given situation and a concrete implementation plan. Therefore, I would like to add some words on the situations that have unfolded since I wrote the New Year’s column, expatiating on my diagnosis at the time and offering some new thoughts on the ensuing events and tasks that have followed.
Regardless of the remaining variables, I find no reason to alter my conclusion that Yoon Suk Yeol’s insurrection has brought ‘a bizarre end to an anomalous state’. Yet, the ongoing bizarre behavior of the insurrection’s leader, coupled with the unwavering support of his followers, necessitates a reevaluation of the insurrection’s character. As time went on, it became evident that extensive preparations for the insurrection had been underway long before the declaration of martial law on December 3. Beyond these preparations, however, the anomalous state by its very nature may have carried within itself an inevitability for an insurrection.
As demonstrated by the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations, having once lost their dominance under the ’87 regime, the established ruling powers has consistently sought to reinstate a pre-1987 order and forestall another such loss. Lee Nam-ju and other Changbi members characterized this as a ‘gradual coup’ or ‘new kind of coup’ (Lee Nam-ju, “This is Not a Phase of a History Textbook Coup, but a New-Style Coup d’État”, pp. 2-5, The Quarterly Changbi, Winter 2015; Han Ki-wook, “Opening the New 50 Years”, The Quarterly Changbi, Spring 2016). The Park Geun-hye government, believing it could extend its rule through a gradual coup, refrained from attempting an outright coup. However, citizens rose up in protest before the end of her term, eventually leading to a change of government. In contrast, the power establishment, having learned from Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, immediately pursued widespread constitutional violations upon Yoon Suk Yeol’s inauguration. This marked the beginning of what Lee Nam-ju termed a ‘soft coup’ (“Insurrection will be Punished, and Our Democracy Will Make Dramatic Progress,” Changbi Weekly Commentary, December 10, 2024). When this plan faltered in the face of public resistance, Yoon escalated his actions to a more reckless coup, that is, an outright insurrection.
In any case, just as the Candlelight Revolution has continued and evolved over time, so too have the potential insurrectionary forces in their own way. This is evident in the series of events following the impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol. In addition to Yoon’s delusional behavior, many members of the governing People Power Party (PPP) have openly spoken in defense of the insurrection, while high-ranking officials such as Han Deok-soo and Choi Sang-mok have actively hindered efforts to terminate it. Meanwhile, much of the media and academic establishment has consistently opposed reform, voicing strong anti-reform sentiments. The so-called ‘Asphalt Far Right’ has also undergone a transformation, from primarily consisting of elderly participants attending rallies for small payments, now to including members of the upper class and even younger generations. Resistance to dismantling the current division system is not confined to a single faction; it spans both ruling and opposition parties, encompassing ‘conservatives’ and ‘progressives’ alike. Whether through acting overtly or in more devious ways, these forces are obstructing the advent of a new world.
It was the direct action of citizens—especially those in their teens, twenties, and thirties—that defied the entrenched cartel and reignited the Candlelight Revolution, now also known as the ‘Light Revolution’ (after the light sticks that mostly replaced candles in the more recent demonstrations). At the same time, we must not overlook the many others who contributed in their own way, each adding strength to the movement. The hesitant response of many soldiers and police officers during the imposition of martial law, coupled with the principled actions of certain commanders, revealed that democratic values had taken root in our society. Significant changes have also occurred within the political sphere. Lee Jae-myung’s leadership of the Democratic Party has been invigorated by the active engagement of candlelight citizens, including formal party membership by many of them, marking a notable shift from previous patterns of political engagement. Numerous lawmakers have also lent their support to the cause. A vivid example is the so-called ‘Great Victory of Namtaeryeong,’ where a powerful alliance formed between traditional resistance groups such as farmers’ activists and younger demonstrators waving K-pop light sticks. But we must also note the intervention of opposition lawmakers who joined the scene and negotiated with the police, eventually gaining permission for a specified number of tractors to break through the police line and enter Seoul.
One key difference between the current situation and the 2016–17 resistance movement lies in the changed political terrain—most notably, the presence of a political leader who enjoys overwhelming support from the majority of the public. This shift has also sharpened the learning curve for the PPP and its supporters, who had been devastated by the fallout of the previous impeachment. In reality, many within the ruling bloc might have distanced themselves from Yoon Suk Yeol long ago—‘Were it not for Lee Jae-myung,’ as they say. Even those who do not fully align with the cartel of reactionaries often take a similar stance. It is undeniable that the current impeachment phase was possible because the public was given the stark choice between Yoon Suk Yeol and Lee Jae-myung. If this is the case, members of Lee Jae-myung’s own party should at the very least be able to explain clearly and honestly why they believe he, of all people, is not the answer, and what alternative they propose. But even now, with the president under arrest and impeachment imminent, some are still harping on the so-called ‘legal risks’ Lee faces, a product of Yoon Suk Yeol’s soft coup, or clinging to constitutional reform ahead of the next presidential election. Doesn’t this echo the very logic of the reactionary forces?
In my personal view, the deep-seated aversion to Lee Jae-myung stems from one key fact: he has never belonged to the establishment cartel, nor has he bowed or compromised under external pressure. For the ruling party and the broader power elite, the notion that Lee is also a competent pragmatist makes him an even greater threat. The concern that ‘Lee Jae-myung alone is not enough’ is a matter best addressed after, rather than before, the presidential election. Rebuilding a nation so thoroughly damaged by Yoon Suk Yeol will undoubtedly be a formidable task. Realistically, could anyone, whether Lee Jae-myung or someone else, faced with the same domestic and international crises, be able to handle them alone? I cannot pretend to know just how many genuinely capable people are positioned around him—those who can be entrusted with key roles after the election—beyond the campaigners focused on securing votes. Nor is this the appropriate place to offer detailed suggestions.
In any case, the emphasis on pragmatism over ideology is in keeping with the core spirit of the Transformative Middle Way. But the meaning of ‘pragmatism’ depends largely on whom it is intended to serve. For the establishment forces, pragmatism is rooted in a cynical ideology—one that sees the public as little more than “dogs and pigs,” content to keep quiet as long as they are fed. By contrast, the Transformative Middle Way promotes a form of pragmatism grounded in a peninsula-wide perspective. It argues that those charged with the historical mission of overcoming the division system must first be liberated from immediate, day-to-day worries of livelihood and personal security. After all, one cannot engage in spiritual growth or mind practice without first resolving basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter. At the same time, as Alfred North Whitehead once wrote (in “The Place of Classics in Education”), “Moral education is impossible without a habitual vision of greatness.” In other words, while meeting material needs is indispensable, lofty goals and aspirations are equally crucial to authentic mind practice.
One major problem with the division system is its tendency to make low-grade discourse dominate the public sphere. Even in opposing the rampage and recklessness of the Yoon Suk Yeol government—whose attacks on constitutional order and the rule of law were so extreme— there is a temptation to equate constitutionalism and the rule of law with democracy itself. While these principles are indeed essential to a democratic society, narrowing the discourse of democracy to them risks ‘cheapening’ the aspirations of the citizens who took to the streets in defense of democracy. This mirrors the logic of the political and intellectual establishment—a logic that shuts out of public discourse the real, practical challenges we face and suppresses our ability to envision a society where an awakened people govern themselves and create a world of fraternity—a vision that demands constant mind practice and mature political engagement and, on the part of the population of the Korean Peninsula, the building of a better system than the division system by mitigating and ultimately dismantling it.
In my New Year’s column, I noted that the Transformative Middle Way not only remains an unfinished task in Korea, but also seems increasingly isolated in the current global context. The inauguration of the US President Trump, who seems largely unconcerned with democratic values, has further exacerbated this unpropitious environment. However, the precise impact of his policies on the Korean situation requires a more nuanced analysis. Even in the case of the isolation of the ‘Light Revolution,’ it is crucial to acknowledge that, while it may not have changed the existing world order, it has at least contributed to preventing its further deterioration. As Professor Nam Ki-jeong pointed out in his detailed analysis in “The Cruel World History That Would Have Unfolded If Martial Law Had Not Been Prevented,” (Changbi Weekly Commentary, December 24, 2024), “What the Korean people and the members of the National Assembly blocked on December 3, 2024—both outside and within the Assembly—was more than just martial law. They also halted the ‘north wind’ and the ‘west wind,’ stopped the momentum for Japan’s constitutional amendment, and prevented the shift towards an official alliance between South Korea and Japan.”[6]
If Trump has been riding the wave of global right-wing populism, and while his re-election would likely prove disastrous for addressing the climate crisis and preserving democratic institutions in the United States, his immediate impact on the Korean Peninsula is not wholly negative. At the very least, Yoon Suk Yeol’s efforts to provoke a ‘north wind’—a military conflict between North and South Korea—have been curtailed. As Professor Nam Ki-jeong also notes, the so-called ‘west wind’ strategy, which sought to leverage the Ukraine war for political gain, has become more difficult to implement. Whether Trump will actually improve relations with North Korea remains to be seen, despite his claims of a personal rapport with Chairman Kim Jong-un. Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit in 2019, the prospect of improving bilateral relations on the condition of North Korea’s denuclearization has become unlikely. However, if Trump—who has recently begun to acknowledge North Korea as a ‘nuclear power’—engages in sincere negotiations for a nuclear freeze or gradual disarmament, this could pave the way for easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and help to mitigate the division system, regardless of the intentions of Trump or Kim.
In fact, the Biden administration’s ‘value-based foreign policy’ and ‘value-based alliances’ represented an idea better suited to a form of ‘Right-wing International.’ While it is true that the democratic institutions of the United States form part of the shared legacy of global democratic citizens, their implementation, even within the US, has been severely limited and marked by deep discrimination. Moreover, these institutions have often been wielded as tools of imperialist intervention and domination abroad. It is time for America’s democratic citizens to critically reflect on the country’s history—one rooted in settler colonialism—and to draw lessons from South Korea’s pioneering civic revolution.
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement on the first day of his second term, coupled with his open support for unlimited oil extraction, is also deeply troubling. However, given the inadequacy of existing international agreements and policies to address the climate crisis, the emergence of a ‘super climate villain’ like Trump may paradoxically offer a moment to fundamentally reimagine the kind of world we must build—one capable of tackling humanity’s challenges in a more harmonious and sustainable way.
The Korean Peninsula, through the upheavals of the late Joseon Dynasty, the defeat of the Donghak Revolution, and the subsequent loss of national sovereignty, has finally given birth to a simple yet profound proposition: “With this Great Opening of matter, let there be a Great Opening of spirit.” This was far more than mere the invention of a slogan—it marked a world-historical event in which the idea of the ‘Late Day Great Opening’ (Hucheon Gaebyeok), originating in Donghak, managed to merge with an indigenous religion that proclaimed itself to be a new Buddhism.
Although Sotaesan lived and worked during the colonial period and was therefore not literally confronted with the task of transforming the division system, he may be considered a forerunner of the Transformative Middle Way, as I argued in “The Idea of the Transformative Middle Way and Sotaesan’s Thought of Great Opening” (2008, Chapter 15 of Where is the Middle Way and Wherefore Transformation?). I later explored how a vision of the Middle Way, aimed at transforming the colonial order, was also pursued by figures such as Uiam Son Byeong-hee, Dosan An Chang-ho, and Mongyang Yeo Un-hyeong (see Chapter 2 of Modernity’s Double Project and Nation-Building Korean Style, and Episode 149 of Practice Road on Paik Nak-chung TV, with Kang Kyeong-seok, January 7, 2025).
If the Candlelight Revolution—also known as the Light Revolution—carries forward the tradition of ‘building a nation worthy of its name’ and the legacy of peaceful revolution initiated by the teachings of Donghak, it becomes evident that the practice of the Transformative Middle Way in our time is inseparable from the making of a World of Great Opening. As I wrote in “Climate Crisis and Modernity’s Double Project,” this means that “it is impossible to realize a new world without seriously engaging with the critique of capitalism advanced by Marx and others,” and simultaneously that “no matter how rigorous and precise one’s analysis of capitalism may be, it is insufficient on its own, even when combined with the revolutionary will to action that Marx emphasized. A radical transformation of civilization remains out of reach without the inner practice of the individual mind leading to the Great Opening” (The same book, Chapter 13, p. 361). Trump’s America has now turned into the world’s strongest predator and extortionist power rather than the global hegemon—a shift that signals the terminal stage of American democracy. In today’s world, where liberalism (including its Leninist variant) which Immanuel Wallerstein characterized as the ‘geo-culture’ of the modern world-system has become virtually bankrupt, the significance of the tradition of Late Day Great Opening and its contemporary manifestations in Korea is growing ever more vital. In this context, the declaration that the time has come for the Transformative Middle Way would hold world-historical importance—one that extends beyond the boundaries of Korea.
[2] This is what Kim Yong-hyun, then Minister of National Defense and widely regarded as the second-in-command of the insurrection, said shortly after the failure of martial law.
[3] “The distinctive claim of the Transformative Middle Way is that a combination is only meaningful if it brings together all three parties”. See page 68 of the above “Postscript”.
[4] This petition seeks to address the injustice of the execution in 1864 of Suun(水雲) Choe Je-u(崔濟愚), the founder of Donghak, and to end the ongoing persecution of the Donghak religion. Historical accounts describe how, in November 1892, a rally at Samnye Station in Jeollado drew an impressive crowd of 3,000 people. Later, in February 1893, Donghak followers marched to the Gwanghwamun Gate at Gyeongbokgung Palace, where they lay down for three days and nights in a peaceful appeal to restore their leader’s honor. Although the crowd dispersed after King Gojong promised to address their concerns, the government soon broke its word and intensified the crackdown. By March of that year, a crowd of 20,000 people—a staggering figure for the time—assembled in Boeun, Chungcheongdo. Ultimately, the suppression of such peaceful movements culminated in the Donghak Peasant War of 1894.
[5] Of course, mind practice is something each person undertakes individually, but we must not forget that collective practice is also an important part of it.
[6] The final two sentences read: “But the tendency is persistent. This is why martial law should be recognized as a world-historical event.”